

DEPARTMENT OF STATE Deputy Under Secretary

G/PM

October 27, 1962

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: The Military Significance of the Soviet Missile Bases in Cuba

NOTE: This memorandum is intended for background use by USUN, and for senior officers in discussions with outside contacts.

- The Soviet missile complex in Cuba, in conjunction with other Soviet intercontinental capabilities, poses an appreciably heightened threat to the US strategic retaliatory forces, and therefore to the Free World deterrent.
- There are more than 30 long-range missile launchers in Cuba, of which over half are already fully operational. The Soviet Union is continuing at rapid pace to complete construction of those missile sites not yet operational.
 - 3. It is now clear that the two dozen defensive missile sives established in Cuba during the late summer and early fall were not intended to "defend" the Cuban people, as is claimed, so much ac to provide protective cover for the offensive Soviet threat. The areas first covered by these defensive sites were precisely those areas where the offensive missiles have now been built. It is now known that the Soviet decision to build Cuba into a massive military threat was taken several months ago; the hypocrisy of Soviet deception over its motives in Cuba has had a long career.

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The main themes to be kept in mind are:

- (1) If an uningeded buildup had been permitted to continue, the whole ballence of Western superiority—upon which the peace of the world has long rested—would have been imperiled.
- (2) The Soviet missile complex already operational in Cuba, in conjunction with other Soviet intercontinental capabilities, does pose an appreciably heightened threat to the US strategic retaliatory forces, and therefore to the Free Morld deterrent.
- (3) The Soviet Union is continuing at rapid pace to complete construction of those missile sites not yet operational.
- (4) There are more than 30 long-range missile launchers in Cuba, of which over half are already fully operational.
- (5) It is now clear that the two dozen defensive missile sites established in Guba during the late summer and early fall were not intended to "defend" the Guban recolle, as in claimed, so much as to provide protective cover for the offensive Soviet threat. The areas first covered by these defensive sites were precisely those areas where the offensive missiles have now been built.
- (6) It is now known that the Soviet decision to build Cuba into a massive military threat was taken several months ago; the hyporiay of Soviet deception over its notives in Cuba has had a long career. Even now the Soviets equivocate between denial and attempts at justification, impaled on the facts that they can do neither convincingly.
- (7) The only way to restore the meace is by the removal of the offensive threat introduced by the Soviet Union into Cuba.

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